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15 July 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## DAILY BRIEF

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ASIA-AFRICA

Republic of the Congo: Street clashes have flared once again in Leopoldville, stimulated in part by a rise in food prices and the failure of many Congolese to receive salaries from absent European employers. The action of the Lumumba government in breaking diplomatic relations with Belgium may bring new friction between Congolese and Europeans, and disorders are unlikely to be checked until an effective UN "presence" is established in the Congo.

OK Although Brussels has indicated its willingness to withdraw its troops to Belgian bases in the Congo as UN contingents arrive, Lumumba has demanded a complete Belgian withdrawal from the Congo, and may use the present situation as a pretext to attempt to force Belgium to give up its Congo bases. In Katanga Province, provincial Premier Tshombé has reasserted the "independence" of Katanga. Tshombé has stated that he will permit Belgian but not UN forces to enter the province, and is unlikely to reconsider his "secession" from the Congo as long as Lumumba--whom he regards as a Communist--remains premier.

OK Japan: Hayato Ikeda, the new president of the Liberal-Democratic party and prospective prime minister, will be handicapped in dealing with internal security problems by the serious factionalism in his party and by the leftists' recent successful use of violence for political ends. Ikeda is anti-Communist and values cooperation with the United States,

but may be tempted to try to undercut the leftist opposition and impress the public by taking a firm attitude toward the US in matters involving the security treaty or by adopting a more conciliatory stance toward Communist China. The extreme leftists, who have previously expressed their hostility toward Ikeda, can be expected to intensify their popular front and mass action tactics in preparation for the general elections which are expected this fall or early next year. [redacted] (Page 4)

### III. THE WEST

[redacted] France-Algeria: De Gaulle is reported planning to name study commissions composed of previously elected Algerian officials--both Europeans and non-FLN Moslems--to examine the political basis for new Algerian institutions, such as the legislative and judicial bodies he referred to in his recent Normandy speeches. De Gaulle may go forward with his program before the end of July. This French tactic may be aimed in part at prodding the rebels to negotiate, but it may result in increased rebel suspicion of De Gaulle's motives and make a resumption of talks more difficult. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 6)

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### Problems of New Japanese Government

Hayato Ikeda, the new president of the Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) and prospective successor to Kishi as prime minister, will be handicapped in dealing with internal security problems by serious factionalism in the ruling LDP. A special convention on 14 July elected Ikeda party president over Mitsujiro Ishii by 302 to 194 in a run-off vote. Ikeda had fallen four votes short of the required majority on the first ballot, which eliminated Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama. Two other contenders, Bamboku Ono and Kenzo Matsumura, had withdrawn from the race to support Ishii in a final effort to stop Ikeda.

The vote ended a month-long wrangle over the succession, but the prospect of a general election this fall or winter will keep alive hopes of Ikeda's rivals for a new chance at the prime ministership after the election. Ikeda, like Kishi, is associated with the bureaucracy, and many members of the LDP are disappointed that a career politician has not been chosen as their new chief.

Ikeda is a strong leader whose prospects for remaining prime minister after the election are considered better than would have been those of his rivals in the race for the party presidency. However, his lack of tact and heavy-handed way of dealing with different factions antagonize other party leaders.

The success of recent leftist violence will further hamper the government in its attempts to restore parliamentary processes and to halt a tendency to accept "government by demonstration." The leftists organized a series of small demonstrations on 14 July against Ikeda and the US-Japanese security treaty and are expected to intensify their mass action tactics in preparation for the election. The stabbing of Prime Minister Kishi by a member of a right-wing organization, the second such incident in a month, suggests that rightists may also resort increasingly to violence.

Ikeda is professedly pro-Western and militantly anti-Communist, but he may seek to undercut the leftist opposition and

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impress the public by taking a firm attitude toward the United States on matters involving the security treaty or by adopting a more conciliatory stance toward establishment of economic relations with Communist China. Last January he stated that Japan should actively seek an accommodation with Peiping following ratification of the security treaty, although he denied favoring recognition. He might hope by such a move to mollify both LDP dissidents and Socialists.

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President de Gaulle may soon name study commissions composed of previously elected Algerian officials to discuss plans for Algeria's future political institutions, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] One press report says four commissions are to be established about the end of July composed of 1) parliamentarians and economic councilors, 2) departmental councilors and mayors of big cities, 3) municipal councilors, and 4) representatives of economic interests. As all Algerian elections since 1958 have been conducted under a system guaranteeing local elected offices to both Europeans and Moslems, the proposed commissions would also include representatives of both populations, but would exclude rebel participation. However, rebel representatives might be invited to join a round-table political discussion with the commissions following a negotiated cease-fire.

In an 8 July speech in Rouen, De Gaulle stated that in an "Algerian Algeria" it would be necessary to have separate institutions, and these could result from the work of the study commissions. The idea of setting up consultative commissions has been broached a number of times in the past by French elements seeking an alternative to direct political negotiations with the rebels. Such a device would have the advantage, from the French point of view, of separating military and political discussions. He may go forward with this study commission program before the end of July.

The French plan may also be aimed at prodding the rebels to come to the conference table, but its denial of the exclusive right of the provisional Algerian government to represent the Moslems of Algeria may prevent rebel acceptance. It is likely to increase rebel suspicion of De Gaulle's motives and make negotiating more difficult, even though top Algerian leaders have recently stated that the "door was open" and they were awaiting the slightest sign from Paris of a sincere desire to negotiate. [REDACTED]

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